{"id":240,"date":"2011-12-02T10:17:14","date_gmt":"2011-12-02T15:17:14","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/?p=240"},"modified":"2011-12-02T17:34:22","modified_gmt":"2011-12-02T22:34:22","slug":"study-suggests-moral-distinction-between-harming-someone-and-passively-allowing-harm-is-automatically-made","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/2011\/12\/study-suggests-moral-distinction-between-harming-someone-and-passively-allowing-harm-is-automatically-made\/","title":{"rendered":"Study suggests moral distinction between harming someone and passively allowing harm is automatically made"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>From the Brown University press release:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><strong>People typically say they are invoking an ethical principle when they  judge acts that cause harm more harshly than willful inaction that  allows that same harm to occur<\/strong>. That difference is even codified in  criminal law. A new study based on brain scans, however, shows that  <strong>people make that moral distinction automatically<\/strong>. Researchers found that <strong> it requires conscious reasoning to decide that active and passive  behaviors that are equally harmful are equally wrong<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<p>For example,  an overly competitive figure skater in one case loosens the skate blade  of a rival, or in another case, notices that the blade is loose and  fails to warn anyone. In both cases, the rival skater loses the  competition and is seriously injured. Whether it is by acting, or  willfully failing to act, the overly competitive skater did the same  harm.<\/p>\n<p>\u00e2\u20ac\u0153What it looks like is when you see somebody actively harm another  person that triggers a strong automatic response,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d said Brown University  psychologist Fiery Cushman. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153You don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t have to think very  deliberatively about it. You just perceive it as morally wrong. When a  person allows harm that they could easily prevent, that actually  requires more carefully controlled deliberative thinking [to view as  wrong].\u00e2\u20ac\u009d<\/p>\n<p>In a study published in advance online in the journal <em>Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience<\/em>,  Cushman and his co-authors presented 35 volunteers with 24 moral  dilemmas and lapses like the one involving the figure skaters. For  specific lengths of time the volunteers would read an introduction to  the incident, a description of the character\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s moral choices, and a  description of how the character behaved. Then they\u00e2\u20ac\u2122d rate the moral  wrongness of the behavior on a scale from 1 to 5. All the while, Cushman  and his co-authors, who were at Harvard University at the time, tracked  the blood flow in the volunteers\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 brains with functional magnetic  resonance imaging scans.<\/p>\n<p>Cushman expected to confirm what he had observed in behavioral  experiments and published in 2006: that people employed conscious  reasoning to arrive at the usual feeling, which is that actively caused  harm is morally worse than the passively caused harm.<\/p>\n<p>Figuring he had a clever way to prove it physiologically, he and his  team compared the brain scans of people who judged active harm to be  worse than passive harm to the scans of people who judged them as  morally equal. His assumption was that those who saw a moral difference  did so by explicit reasoning. Such people should therefore have  exhibited greater activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex than  those who saw no moral distinction. But to Cushman\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s surprise, the  greater levels of DPFC activity lay with those who saw active harm and  passive harm as morally the same.<\/p>\n<p>\u00e2\u20ac\u0153The people who are showing this distinction are actually the ones  who show the least evidence of deliberative, careful, controlled  thinking,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d he said, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153whereas the people who show no difference between  actions and omissions show the most evidence of careful deliberative  controlled thinking.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d<\/p>\n<p><strong>Social judgment<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Cushman emphasized that his research does not suggest which moral  judgment is right. But it is notable that our legal system enshrines the  belief that active harm is worse than passive harm.<\/p>\n<p>As one example, he cites a 1997 U.S. Supreme Court decision (Vacco v. Quill)  in which the court ruled that given explicit permission from a patient,  a doctor cannot directly euthanize the patient, such as with an  overdose of morphine, but the doctor can follow a patient\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s directive to  cease life support or other treatment. In the case, the district court  in New York initially ruled the way the Supreme Court ultimately did,  but the appeals court in between ruled that euthanasia and ending life  support were essentially the same.<\/p>\n<p>Cushman said his new findings may be useful because they describe the  mechanisms underlying how they, and perhaps society in general, arrive  at moral judgments. Drawing on the metaphor offered by authors Max H.  Bazerman and Ann E. Tenbrunsel in their ethics book <em>Blind Spots<\/em>, he suggests that the extra thought required to judge passive harm as morally wrong might be analogous to a blind spot.<\/p>\n<p>Much as drivers learn to look over their shoulder before changing  lanes, he said, people may want to examine how they feel about passive  harm. Especially in specific, real-life situations, they may still  conclude that active harm is worse, but they\u00e2\u20ac\u2122ll at least have  compensated for the automatic bias his research suggests is there.<\/p>\n<p>In addition to Cushman, other authors  include Dylan Murray, Shauna Gordon-McKeon. Sophie Wharton, and Joshua  Greene. The research was supported by the Arete Initiative and the  National Science Foundation.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<!-- AddThis Advanced Settings generic via filter on the_content --><!-- AddThis Share Buttons generic via filter on the_content -->","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>From the Brown University press release: People typically say they are invoking an ethical principle when they judge acts that cause harm more harshly than willful inaction that allows that&#8230; <a class=\"read-more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/2011\/12\/study-suggests-moral-distinction-between-harming-someone-and-passively-allowing-harm-is-automatically-made\/\">Read more &raquo;<\/a><!-- AddThis Advanced Settings generic via filter on get_the_excerpt --><!-- AddThis Share Buttons generic via filter on get_the_excerpt --><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[6],"tags":[42,75,12],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/240"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=240"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/240\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":241,"href":"https:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/240\/revisions\/241"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=240"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=240"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/therapytoronto.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=240"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}